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Introduction 
 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century the development of unemployment 
protection policy in France followed a dualistic logic. While those with longer work 
records could continue to rely on relatively generous wage-related support if they 
became unemployed, an increasing number of other workers came to depend on 
alternative, less generous, provisions, often not designed with the risk of 
unemployment in mind. Insurance-based and assistance-based benefits for the 
unemployed were both largely passive, their delivery not strongly articulated with the 
activities of the Public Employment Services (PES). Since the beginning of the new 
millennium, however, an emphasis on activation that germinated in the expanding 
social assistance margins of the French social protection system has gradually gained 
ground more widely, and has in turn stimulated efforts to reconnect and synchronise 
provisions for different groups in the unemployed population. While the interests and 
strategies of powerful policy actors ensure dualistic tendencies remain strongly 
embedded in French unemployment protection policy, they are thus increasingly 
challenged by integrative policy logics that are encouraging the development of a 
more unified benefit-and-service system for all the non-employed. 
 
This chapter traces the conflict between the logics of dualisation and integration in 
reforms to the regulation of the unemployment risk in France over the last two 
decades. The argument is organised in three parts. To place later developments in 
context, section one first describes how France’s unemployment and labour market 
policies were initially restructured in the 1980s in the face of pressures of high 
unemployment and broader economic change. Section two then analyses the evolution 
of unemployment protection between 1990 and 2010 in detail, focusing in particular 
on the three analytical dimensions outlined in the introductory chapter to this volume. 
A third section offers an explanatory interpretation of the trends observed, 
emphasising in particular how in the French case the dualistic reform strategy of the 
1980s and 1990s in fact sowed the seeds of its own later - though as yet only partial - 
reversal. 
 
3.1 Organising Labour Shedding: French Labour Market Policies in the 1980s 
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In France as elsewhere, the early 1980s was a period of slow growth and far-reaching 
economic restructuring, with unemployment rising extremely fast as vast numbers of 
workers were made redundant from traditional industries (see statistical annex, tables 
3 and 5). The initial response of French governments was to endeavour to redistribute 
employment opportunities though the reduction of labour supply, especially among 
older workers. Early retirement benefit schemes had been initiated by conservative 
governments in the early 1970s, but were vastly expanded by the socialist government 
elected in 1981 (IGAS, 2004: 156-157). Although driven partly by successive 
governments, this policy of ‘labour shedding’ was largely organised and financed 
through the unemployment insurance system, which was formally under the 
managerial control of trade unions and employer representatives. Along with fast 
rising unemployment, the policy contributed to mounting deficits in the dedicated 
unemployment insurance fund, UNEDIC (Union national interprofessionnelle pour 
l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce). A major financial crisis was averted in 
1979 only by the then conservative government agreeing to subsidise the previously 
entirely contribution-financed fund out of general taxation. When massive deficits 
reappeared in 1982, however, the socialist government – on the cusp of its historic 
‘turn to rigour’ – refused to increase the share of the tax subsidy, while the social 
partners objected to modifying contribution rates to fund measures that they had not 
themselves decided upon (Clegg, 2005: 159-163). 
 
To find a way out of the budgetary crisis, between 1982 and 1984 the government and 
the social partners negotiated a new division of labour in the sphere of labour market 
policy (ibid; Clegg and Palier, 2007). The government agreed to relieve UNEDIC of 
the burden of financing the largest early retirement schemes, the cost of which were 
fully transferred to the state budget. In 1983 - to honour a pledge included in 
Mitterrand’s election manifesto two years earlier - the state retirement age was also 
lowered from 65 to 60, freeing UNEDIC of the need to provide unemployment 
benefits to many older workers. More significantly for present purposes, though, the 
new division of labour additionally introduced a separation between ‘insurance’ and 
‘solidarity’ benefits for the unemployed. Insurance benefits would continue to provide 
earnings-related support for the unemployed, but with entitlement more closely linked 
to the contribution record of the claimants than in the past. These would be financed 
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uniquely from social contributions, and regulated through periodic collective 
agreements negotiated between the social partners and extended by law. Solidarity 
benefits would for their part provide benefits to those who were not, or were no 
longer, eligible for insurance as a result of their contribution record or unemployment 
duration. These benefits were to be financed out of general taxation, and regulated by 
the state. Through this explicit partition of unemployment insurance (UI) and 
unemployment assistance (UA), the ‘logic of integration’ that had characterised much 
of the post-war history of French unemployment protection was thus superseded, 
under pressure of rising unemployment and mounting costs, by a ‘logic of 
segmentation’ (Daniel, 2000). 
 
Though the socialist government embraced budgetary rigour after 1983, it fell far 
short of a fully-fledged neo-liberal conversion. Even the conservative Chriac 
government elected in 1986 soon toned down its initially bold deregulatory rhetoric 
when it observed how little appetite there appeared to be for this among the French 
electorate. Resistance to structural reform, particularly of the labour market, remained 
high in France throughout the 1980s (Smith, 2004). As a consequence France 
maintained one of the most regulated labour markets in Europe which, allied to 
substantial non-wage labour costs and a relatively high minimum wage, tended to 
impede job creation, particularly in low-skill sectors of the economy (Cahuc and 
Kramarz, 2005; Malo et al, 2000). The social effects of the high unemployment that 
resulted were cushioned by the continued use of the social protection system for 
labour shedding, or what in France was more commonly known as the ‘social 
treatment of unemployment’ (Daguerre and Palier, 2004; see also Levy, 2001; Vail, 
2010). 
 
Though French governments gradually ran down tax-funded early retirement 
measures in the 1980s, these were soon replaced by new schemes managed by the 
social partners through UNEDIC (see section 3.2 below). As a result early exit 
continued to grow in France even as it started to stabilise in other European countries 
(Ebbinghaus, 2006: 105). Unemployment benefits proper played a role in encouraging 
this too. In UI, age-related eligibility criteria allowed older workers with good 
contribution records to receive benefits right up to retirement age. In 1984 a 
mechanism called dispense de recherche d’emploi (DRE) was also introduced, freeing 
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older unemployed people receiving either UI or UA of the need to register with the 
PES, and therefore ensuring that they were no longer counted in the politically 
sensitive national unemployment statistics. By 1990 more than 225,000 people 
received unemployment benefits with a DRE (see Figure 3.3 below). 
 
The desire to massage unemployment figures was also one of the prime motivations 
behind another popular strategy for the social treatment of unemployment in the 
1980s; the vast expansion of job creation schemes. Targeted first at young people and 
later at the long-term unemployed, a series of special employment programmes were 
introduced during the decade, providing the unemployed with jobs in the public and 
para-public sectors on a temporary and usually part-time basis (Erhel, 2009; Meyer, 
1999). Initially smaller programmes also existed offering social contribution 
exemptions to private firms hiring from specific target groups among the unemployed, 
though these were always more controversial with the trade unions, who saw them as 
‘a gift to employers’ and a means of deregulating the labour market by the back door. 
As such schemes expanded nonetheless, they arguably did tend to gradually 
undermine the role played by full-time permanent employment paid at minimum 
wage level in setting the minimum norm for work in low-skill sectors of the labour 
market, and thus helped legitimise greater use of non-subsidised precarious 
employment contracts (Castel, 2007). 
 
Although the social protection system expanded vastly in the 1980s to cushion the 
effects of high unemployment, its net still had holes through which many victims of 
economic change fell. During the 1980s media attention came to focus more and more 
on the so called ‘new poor’, a term that covered groups of individuals who were being 
thrown into poverty as a result of the prolonged economic crisis and an absence of 
adequate non contributory social protection (Paugam, 1993). The UA scheme 
introduced for the long-term unemployed in 1984 was of only limited help, as it had 
contribution conditions that were actually more demanding than those in UI, and 
which many unemployed people – and especially those previously employed in the 
growing precarious sector of the labour market - therefore failed to meet. 
 
Francois Mitterrand made the plight of the new poor one of the central themes in his 
re-election campaign, and pledged to introduce a general, national social assistance 
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(SA) scheme. Though France had a localised system of discretionary ‘social aid’ and 
a number of categorical means-tested benefits covering different social risks, there 
had previously been widespread hostility across the political spectrum to the 
introduction of a general SA scheme (Belorgey, 1988; Clegg, 2002). Following 
Mitterrand’s re-election in 1988 the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) was 
introduced, providing a means-tested minimum income to all over-25s not in work. 
The insertion element of the RMI referred to a clause whereby the benefit was in 
principle paid on the basis of a ‘reciprocal engagement’ by the state and the claimant 
to take measures to promote the latter’s social or professional integration.   
 
While this may suggest an emphasis on activation, social protection was not – yet – 
conceived in these terms in France. The insertion requirement in SA was essentially a 
myth, intended more to legitimise the introduction of generalised social assistance 
than to actually guide the administrative treatment of minimum income recipients 
(Clegg and Palier, forthcoming). No recipients of SA were obliged to register with the 
PES as a condition for receipt of benefit. Unless they benefited from a DRE, 
recipients of UI and UA were obliged, and in principle also to accept offers of suitable 
work or face the risk of total suspension of their benefit. Signing-on (pointage) was 
however more a simple bureaucratic requirement than part of an active employment 
policy, and sanctions were rarely applied (Barbier and Kaufmann, 2007: 109). In UI 
the principle of benefit being an earned return on contributions paid was strong; the 
prevailing understanding was that “one contributes to be covered against a risk; when 
that risk materialises, one must be compensated” (Borgetto, 2009: 1045). 
 
Underscoring the limited emphasis on activation was the traditional lack of any real 
institutional articulations between the administration of non-employment benefits and 
the administration of job search and employment policy. Scope for greater co-
operation was long limited by the different legal statuses of the organisations that 
administered French labour market policy (CERC, 2005: 23-25). While the PES was a 
national structure controlled by the state, UNEDIC was a formally private 
organisation under the managerial control of the social partners, and entirely financed 
out of social contributions. As for insertion policies designed for recipients of SA, 
these were mainly organised on a decentralised level by local authorities, who co-
financed them along with the state. 
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3.2. Re-regulating the risk of unemployment in France, 1990-2010 
 
In 1990 France thus had a three-tiered structure of benefit for unemployed, 
comprising UI, UA (with separate benefit schemes for the long-term unemployed and 
labour market entrants) and SA, though the latter was not formally an unemployment 
benefit. Also defined out of the official scope of unemployment were large numbers 
of individuals receiving early retirement benefits and those participating in large 
labour market programmes. None of the systems of benefit provision for the 
unemployed were closely articulated with the work of PES. The labour market policy 
administration was characterised by internal divisions resulting form different modes 
of governance (social partners, state, local authorities) and of financing (social 
contributions, general taxation, local taxation). 
 
<< Table 3.1 about here >> 
 
Structurally, French labour market policy appears to have changed little between 1990 
and 2010. The benefit system in 2010 remained three-tiered, and although 
unemployment and social assistance benefits had lost some value relative to the 
minimum wage, overall benefits were paid at broadly similar levels to 20 years ago. A 
majority of other key institutional parameters are also suggestive of stability rather 
than transformation (see Table 3.1, most significant formal changes are in bold text). 
Nonetheless, as this section shows, the last two decades have seen substantial changes 
in the role and understanding of different unemployment benefits, a gradual 
strengthening of the conceptual and organisational articulation between active 
measures and a range of benefits, as well as shifts in the boundaries between active 
and inactive groups of benefit claimants. In this process, and formal institutional 
stability notwithstanding, policy logics that were initially perpetuated and even 
intensified have latterly come to be seriously challenged.  
 
2.1 Benefits: Dualisation and beyond 
 
After a transitory economic boom at the end of the 1980s, at the beginning of the 
1990s France experienced a serve recession, plunging UNEDIC into deficit again. In 
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1992 the social partners responded by negotiating consequential changes in the 
eligibility and entitlement parameters for UI. The existing UI benefits were replaced 
with a new single ‘degressive’ benefit (Allocation Unique Degressive, AUD), under 
which the level of benefits was periodically reduced over the course of an 
unemployment spell, initially at a rate of around 17% every 4 months (and faster for 
those under-25). The minimum duration of contribution for access to UI was also 
increased, from 3 to 4 months in the last 8. Finally, the duration of benefit was sharply 
reduced for those with only 6 months of contributions in the last year, from 15 months 
for under-50s and 21 months for over-50s to 7 months for the unemployed of all ages. 
Of the large number of unemployed people who found themselves excluded from UI 
with the introduction of AUD - beneficiary rates declined sharply after the reform (see 
Figure 3.1) – a disproportionate number were younger people and those previously 
employed on fixed term contracts (Daniel and Tuchszirer, 1999: 307). 
 
<< Figure 3.1 about here >> 
 
This reform and its further tightening in 1993 had a spectacular effect on UNEDIC’s 
finances, which were in surplus by 8.7 billion FF in 1993 and 22.4 billion FF by 1995, 
even though unemployment had continued to rise up the end of 1993 and had 
remained stable thereafter (see statistical annex, table 5). Rather than repairing all the 
cuts introduced in 1992, however, in their subsequent negotiations on UI the social 
partners agreed a series of changes that mainly improved the situation of those 
already eligible for benefit (ibid: 306; see also Annex 3.1). In 1995 a new early 
retirement benefit was introduced, open to those with 40 years of contributions and 
meeting certain age conditions. The following year, instead of extending benefit 
duration or relaxing contributory requirements, the new collective agreement instead 
slightly improved replacement rates and slowed down the application of the 
degressivity mechanism, which now operated every six months instead of every four. 
In 1999 the beneficiary rate of UI actually reached its lowest ever level, at 42.1%. 
 
For many of those excluded from UI as a result of these parametric choices, UA 
offered little help. The scheme for labour market entrants (Allocation d’Insertion, AI) 
was closed-off to its main group of beneficiaries – young people – in 1991, the then 
socialist government deeming that it was preferable for young unemployed people to 
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be enrolled in more active labour market measures. The number of beneficiaries fell 
by 75%, or around 100,000 people, between 1990 and 19921. As for the UA scheme 
for the long-term unemployed (Allocation Spécifique de Solidairité, ASS), it as 
mentioned had rather stricter contribution requirements than UI, demanding 5 years of 
contributions in the last 10. Though in 1992 the social affairs inspectorate warned of 
the risk of a “very serious social regression” if these were not relaxed (IGAS, 1992), 
the government paid no heed. In fact, contribution requirements were further 
strengthened in 19972, when the means test was also made stricter. 
 
Although the number of special employment measures was expanded and diversified 
in the early 1990s – the stock of people in the main public sector scheme, CES, 
increased from 150,000 in 1989 to 350,000 in 1993 (Meyer, 1999: 86) – many of the 
unemployed were therefore left with no source of income, and forced to fall back on 
the still relatively new SA scheme. It was into SA, rather than UA, that the majority 
of the needy unemployed no longer eligible for UI were transferred (Figure 3.2). 
 
<< Figure 3.2 about here >> 
 
Largely as a result of this, the SA caseload more than doubled between 1990 and 
1995, and continued to grow rapidly up to the turn of the millennium. One 
consequence was that the profile of the beneficiaries of SA quickly diverged from the 
image of the ‘socially excluded’ that had been very present at the time of the 
introduction of the RMI. In reality the new entrants were increasingly young and 
socially integrated, but out of work (Clary, 1995; Cordazzo, 2003). Another 
consequence, more widely debated, was the growing cost of the tax-financed RMI: 
while 5 billion French Francs (€ 0.76 billion) were allocated from the state budget for 
the new scheme in 1989, the cost had more than quadrupled to 21.4 billion FF (€ 3.26 
billion) by the time of the 1997 budget (Lafore, 1996). 
 
The main dynamic in French unemployment benefit reforms in the 1990s was thus a 
sort of dualisation in provision (cf. Clegg, 2007; Palier, 2010); on the one hand there 
                                                 
1 In 2006 AI was replaced by the temporary waiting allowance (Allocation Temporaire d’Attente, 
ATA), the main beneficiaries of which are asylum seekers and those coming out of prison. 
2 Instead of 5 years contributions, it was henceforth necessary to have actually worked for 5 years; 
periods of e.g. insured unemployment for which contributions were paid were thus no longer counted.   
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was an increasingly ‘exclusive’ UI system, paying still relatively generous earnings-
related benefits to those with better contribution records, on the other SA for those 
who could not qualify for UI and had low incomes. In between UA continued to exist, 
but was allowed to atrophy. Only the UA scheme for the long-term unemployed was 
of any quantitative significance by the end of 1990s, but its restrictive contribution 
conditions meant that it was a scheme that was largely reserved for unemployed 
people aged 50 and above (Gilles and Loisy, 2005)3. 
 
This developmental dynamic was partially arrested in the early 2000s, when 
beneficiary rates for UI recovered substantially, and reliance on SA declined 
concomitantly. Between December 1999 and December 2003, UI beneficiary rates 
increased by around 12% (cf. Figure 3.1), while the SA caseload fell for the first time 
since the introduction of the RMI in 1988 (cf. Figure 3.2). Part of the reason for this 
was the effect of the period of strong employment growth from the late 1990s, which 
had an automatic entitlement effect in UI. But part was also a result of changes in the 
eligibility and entitlement parameters of UI agreed in 2001. This was the year when a 
generalised system of activation was introduced into UI for the first time, on the back 
of proposals put forward by the employers’ association (see below). To leverage the 
agreement of at least some of the trade union confederations for this activation 
principle, however, the employers agreed to a relaxation of the restrictive measures 
that had been introduced over the previous decade. Minimum contribution conditions 
were substantially reduced – from 4 months of contribution in the previous 8 to 4 
months in the previous 18 - and the degressivity mechanism scrapped altogether. As a 
result of the first measure in particular, ‘bad contributors’ (les précaires) were for the 
first time in a decade the major winners in a parametric reform of UI. 
 
<< Table 3.2 about here >> 
 
The social partners partially retreated from this new concern for opening UI to less 
good contributors in the mid-2000s, only to return to it at the end of the decade, this 
time in a rapidly worsening employment context (see Table 3.2). As a result of the 
                                                 
3 The conservative Raffarin government in fact attempted to limit the maximum duration of ASS 
receipt to 2 years in 2003, but this measure was withdrawn by President Chirac following his party’s 
poor showing in local elections in early 2004.  
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combined effects of rising unemployment, the relatively disappointing results of the 
activation measures introduced in 2001, and an imbalance between the extensions to 
benefits and reductions in UI contribution rates decided in the previous collective 
agreement, UNEDIC found itself facing yet another difficult budgetary situation by 
the 2003. The agreements of 2004 and then 2006 responded by altogether removing 
the bottom tier of entitlement for UI; henceforth only those who had contributed for at 
least 6 months, albeit in a still lengthy reference period of 22 months, could access UI. 
In these reforms, however, the cuts were more equally shared than in 1992; the 
duration of benefits was reduced from 30 months (or 45 for over-50s) to 23 months 
for those with contribution records of 14 months in the last two years, and from 45 
months to 36 months for over-50s with 27 months of contributions in the last 3 years. 
From 2009, moreover, provided an individual has worked a minimum of 4 months in 
the last two years, the duration of benefit payment is strictly equal to the duration of 
contribution before entering employment, up to a maximum 25 months for under-50s 
and 36 months for over-50s. The biggest winners in this reform were those with 4 or 5 
month contribution records; the biggest losers those with between contribution 
records of between 16 and 22 months for under-25s and between 27 and 35 months 
for over 50s (Cornilleu and Elbaum, 2009). 
 
Reforms of UI in France are chronically pro-cyclical; because the social partners’ 
ability to balance their budget is the guarantor of the long-term viability of the 
autonomous system that both the unions and employers support, incentives are strong 
for them to cut benefits back in periods of rising unemployment, and increase them as 
unemployment declines (ibid.). This pattern held across the period between 1990 and 
2010; what varied was the distribution of costs and benefits during the periods of belt-
tightening and expansion respectively. In the early 1990s it was above all ‘bad 
contributors’ who saw their already minimal benefit entitlements cut when times were 
tough; but by the late 2000s it is those with better levels of protection on whom the 
biggest losses are being imposed. 
 
2.2 From insertion to activation 
 
It was in SA that the concern with the development of more vigorous policies for 
reintegrating claimants of non-employment benefits back into the labour market 
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developed first in France. As described above, the introduction of a general SA 
scheme in 1988 had been accompanied with an essentially rhetorical requirement for 
benefit to be articulated with measures of social or professional reinsertion. 
Unsurprisingly, early evaluations of the new SA showed that this aspect of the scheme 
functioned poorly (Vanlerenberghe, 1992). Very few claimants singed, or were even 
made aware of, insertion contracts (Lefèvre and Zoyem, 1999). Even as the profile of 
SA claimants changed due to reforms in unemployment benefit, insertion measures 
that were organised remained most often related to social, rather than professional, 
insertion, focusing on issues such as health and housing (Castra, 2003). And claimants 
often reported that the signature of an insertion contract had not been helpful to them, 
especially when it focused on reintegration in work (Zoyem, 2001).  
 
By the late 1990s, however, the succession of negative evaluations – as well as the 
growing size and cost of a scheme that was originally intended to be marginal - 
resulted in pressure for reform of the insertion dimension of SA (Clegg and Palier, 
forthcoming). First, under the socialist-led Jospin government in 1998, the 
possibilities to cumulate receipt of SA with income from work for a limited period 
were considerably extended, amidst a growing concern about the disincentives to 
work facing recipients of SA and the more general need to ‘make work pay’ in a 
labour market characterised by a growing number of temporary and part-time jobs4. 
Then, in 2004 and with the conservatives back in office, a reform of the SA scheme 
greatly increased the emphasis on professional relative to social forms of insertion 
activity for claimants (Lafore, 2004: 25), and introduced a new special employment 
contract specifically reserved for SA recipients. The same reform also decentralised 
the financing and administration of SA to local authorities. Though SA was largely 
caught up in the general decentralising ardour of the Raffarin government, a 
supplementary argument was that with the costs of benefit provision falling on local 
authorities, they would have incentives to organise more energetic and work-focused 
insertion activities. 
 
By this time, an emphasis on the articulation between benefit provision and support 
for return to the labour market had begun to characterise debates around UI too. In 
                                                 
4 Attesting to the same preoccupation, the socialist government introduced a work-conditioned negative 
income tax in 2001, the Prime pour l’emploi (PPE). 
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2000 the employers association - largely in response to the Socialist-led government’s 
high profile legislation on the 35-hour working week, and in the context of a shift in 
power between different federations within the main employers’ confederation (see 
section 3.3, below) - launched an ambitious structural reform agenda called the 
réfondation sociale, in which the thoroughgoing activation of unemployment benefits 
was a showpiece proposal. Ostensibly designed to embarrass the government, the 
employers’ strategy also directly menaced the survival of the social partner managed 
UNEDIC, which the employers threatened to suspend their participation in if 
negotiations over their reform projects were not successfully concluded. Largely to 
head off this risk (Freyssinet, 2002), but also in return for some concessions on the 
generosity of benefits (see above), a number of the unions reached agreement with the 
employers over a new UI system. From 2001 the main UI benefit was as a result re-
cast as a ‘return to work benefit’ (allocation de retour á l’emploi – ARE), and 
eligibility was henceforth conditioned not only on the payment of contributions but 
also on claimants signing and respecting and individualised project for help with the 
return to work (plan d’aide au retour á l’emploi, PARE). 
 
At the demand of the government, who were concerned about the possible emergence 
of parallel employment service networks for the insured and other jobseekers, 
responsibility for the implementation and monitoring of the PARE was ultimately 
vested in the PES rather than in UNEDIC, as the social partners had originally 
planned. The local offices of the UI system continued to deliver benefits separately 
from placement services and the administration of employment policy instruments. 
Criticisms were soon voiced as to the impact of this multi-agency delivery structure 
on the effectiveness of the new activation policy (Cour des Comptes, 2006; 
Marimbert, 2004), and the old idea of a merger between the PES and UNEDIC 
gradually returned to the top of the policy agenda. After a number of years of 
experimentations with more-or-less effective ‘reinforced co-operations’ between the 
local-level offices of the two organisations (Vericel, 2006), the merger was finally 
implemented in February 2008, 9 months after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy – who 
had pledged this reform in his manifesto – as President. Though out of a concession to 
the social partners the UI system was not totally absorbed by the state-run PES – the 
social partners retaining notably responsibility for fixing the eligibility and 
entitlement parameters of UI through collective agreements – the new state-run Pôle 
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Emploi is now responsible for the integrated delivery of unemployment benefits, 
placement services and employment policies (Willmann, 2009). This reform 
considerably weakened the organisational strength of UNEDIC, which henceforth has 
between 100 and 200 employees nationwide as opposed to around 14,000 previously. 
 
The period since the election of Sarkozy has seen the activation emphasis in French 
labour market policy considerably emphasised in other respects, too. In August 2008 a 
new ‘law on the rights and responsibilities of jobseekers’ was adopted (Rousseau, 
2009). With limited emphasis on the rights of jobseekers – which in any case remain 
formally a prerogative of the social partners, at least as far as UI is concerned – the 
law reformed both the definition of reasonable work offers that jobseekers are 
required to accept and the regime of sanctions that can be imposed if they fail to do 
so, or more generally do not comply with the terms of their jobseekers’ agreement, 
now known as the ‘Personalised Project for Access to Employment’. In respect of 
both reasonable work definitions and the sanction regime the legislation represented 
less a tightening of rules than a greater specification and diversification of them, 
based on the understanding that it was the bluntness of pre-existing rules that led to 
them being routinely ignored in administrative practice. For example, where 
previously the only administrative sanction was total eviction from the jobseekers 
register resulting in complete suspension of benefits for those obliged to sign on, the 
new sanction regime allows the possibility for partial and/or temporary reductions in 
benefit entitlements for those failing to discharge their responsibilities as jobseekers. 
 
Since July 2009, this regime also applies to the vast majority of SA claimants. This 
follows from a reform of SA that replaced the pre-existing RMI with a new Active 
Solidarity Income (Revenu de Solidarité Active, RSA). The most high profile aspect 
of the RSA is that SA in France can henceforth be received either as an out-of-work 
benefit (‘RSA socle’) or in-work, as a permanent subsidy to low-paying employment 
(‘RSA activité’). The reform was explicitly focused on trying to help the situation of 
the working poor, and in so-doing on increasing the differential between incomes for 
those in and out of work – but with the obvious risk of encouraging the further 
expansion of part-time and temporary work (Lafore, 2009). But the RSA also 
substantially strengthened the activation emphasis in SA for those out of the labour 
market (Clegg and Palier, forthcoming). The reform established an even clearer 
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hierarchy between professional and social forms of insertion activity in which all SA 
claimants should be engaged; social forms of insertion should henceforth be clearly 
reserved for the minority of beneficiaries with such serious problems that they could 
not immediately consider a return to work-related activity of any kind, and should 
then explicitly be a first step in a process ultimately leading to professional insertion. 
Furthermore, professional insertion for SA claimants will not, as in the past, be 
organised independently of other employment policies; instead, the majority of 
recipients of the RSA will now be obliged to register as jobseekers and to sign a 
PPAE specifying their rights and responsibilities, as for any other jobseeker. 
 
The reform that introduced the RSA also substantially streamlined France’s battery of 
special employment measures; in place of a range of measures managed by different 
administrations and targeted on different (if partially overlapping) groups of benefit 
claimants, there will now be a single insertion contract (contrat unique d’insertion) 
that can be used to support the return-to-work of all jobseekers, irrespective of their 
benefit status. Having become considerably more active since the late 1990s, French 
policies towards the unemployed have thus in the late 2000s become – at least in their 
active dimensions - significantly more integrated too. 
 
2.3 Exit routes: from cheapening to closure 
 
A further implication of the new SA scheme introduced in 2009 was a considerably 
expanded definition of those who are considered as jobseekers, and are subject to the 
obligation to look for work. Under the RMI registration at the PES was voluntary; 
with the RSA it became obligatory for all but a very small minority of SA claimants. 
Furthermore, the RSA replaced not only the RMI but also the means-tested benefit for 
single parents, Allocation de Parent Isolé. Most of the 200,000 beneficiaries of this 
scheme are also now required to actively seek work. The RSA is also far more explicit 
than the RMI it replaced that obligations to seek work apply to all working-age 
members of the claimant household. Finally, it is not merely those out of work who 
are required to actively seek employment; recipients of the RSA-activité with low pre-
transfer incomes from work must, theoretically, remain in contact with the PES and 
demonstrate that they are taking steps to find more work (Clegg and Palier, 
forthcoming). 
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This expansion was rendered possible by the adoption from 2009 of a new procedure 
for tracking the unemployment rate. Where previously the national unemployment 
rate was based on a combination of the national labour force survey and the 
jobseekers’ register, reconciled according to a statistical adjustment procedure 
(calage), the politically sensitive monthly unemployment rate is now based only the 
former. This change was justified on technical grounds, by the increasing difficulty of 
using the two sources due to growing discrepancies between them. But it also meant 
that “the public authorities are now free to take in hand people ‘encountering 
employment difficulties’ without fear that measures taken to increase the employment 
rate will lead to an aggravation of the unemployment statistics” (Rousseau, 2009: 
1104). 
 
The broader concern for bringing people back into the labour market and closing off 
‘exit routes’ in the benefit system had however been building up for some time. 
Despite France having a legal retirement age of 60 up until 2010, around 300,000 
people were still benefiting from early retirement measures in 1990 (IRES, 2004), and 
early retirement was further expanded in response to the recession of the early 1990s. 
Thereafter governments tried to run down use of these instruments, mainly for fiscal 
consolidation reasons. Even then their attempts were partially counteracted by the 
decisions of the social partners, who used the UI system to keep a certain number of 
exit routes open. For example, the ARPE (Allocation de remplacement pour l’emploi) 
early retirement scheme - contribution-financed and managed through UNEDIC - was 
introduced in late 1995, and grew up to a peak of 100,000 beneficiaries in 2000. 
 
<< Figure 3.3 about here >> 
 
Since the turn of the millennium early retirement measures of all kinds (tax- and 
contribution-financed) have declined steadily, irrespective of the employment context. 
Initially, however, the driver of reform appeared to be less that of closing off exist 
routes out of the labour market than of making labour shedding cheaper by 
subsidising it less generously. Accordingly, from around the time that numbers of 
early retirement pensions began their steady decline, the number of DRE for those on 
unemployment benefits began to climb just as rapidly (cf. Figure 3.3). By 2006 there 
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were more than 400,000 people in receipt of unemployment benefits, but not obliged 
to register with the PES and not, therefore, counted among the unemployed. This 
ensured that even though numbers of early retirement benefits fell in the 2000s, 
France’s activity rates among over-55s remained among the lowest in Europe (see 
statistical annex, table 7). 
 
The law on the rights and responsibilities of jobseekers in 2008 marked a break with 
this policy. It legislated for the progressive suppression of DRE; though those who 
currently benefit from the measure will not be brought back into the labour market, 
the age at which it is possible to have a DRE will be gradually raised until 2012, when 
the measure will be formally withdrawn to new entrants. In parallel, the government 
has also promised that extra resources will be guaranteed to the PES to provide 
‘reinforced support’ for over-50s seeking work. 
 
3. From dualisation to triple integration? Understanding change in French 
labour market policy 
 
As the preceding discussion has shown, there has been considerable change in French 
labour market policy, and in the regulation of the risk of unemployment, since 1990. 
Across the period as a whole, however, two rather contradictory trends are visible (see 
Table 3.3). Up to at least the end of the 1990s, the main dynamic of change was 
towards the dualisation of policies for the non-employed. Reforms in benefits created 
an ever-sharper distinction between insurance-based provision for good contributors 
and general assistance for those with weaker labour market attachment; the 
intervening benefit tier of UA atrophied. The definition of unemployment as a risk 
category focused ever more narrowly on core workers in receipt of UI, with other 
groups of workers coming to rely on benefits without a formal link to employment. 
And even when activation policies developed, they did so initially in a dualised form, 
with different arrangements for SA claimants on the one-hand and UI recipients on 
the other, and without the PES having strong linkages to either of the main benefit 
systems for the non-employed. 
 
<< Table 3.3 about here >> 
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During the 2000s, however, this dualising tendency in French labour market policy 
was increasingly challenged, and by the end of the decade reforms had been adopted 
that were suggestive of its at least partial reversal across all the policy dimensions 
considered here. The 2009 UI agreement thus relaxed the contributory conditions for 
benefit, confirming a still tentative retreat from the specialisation between insurance 
and assistance that was first hinted at by reforms in the early 2000s. A series of 
reforms in 2008 and 2009 also partially reconnected and considerably rationalised the 
labour market policy administration, with Pôle Emploi now delivering both benefits 
and labour market services to UI claimants, as well as organising the professional 
insertion of SA recipients, on the basis of a universal set of job search rules that apply 
all jobseekers. And these changes also drew SA claimants and single-parents back 
into the formal category of jobseekers, which will be further enlarged by the closure 
that is underway of exit routes out of the labour market for older workers. 
 
How can these patterns of policy change be accounted for? Much of the dualistic 
dynamic in policy development up to the late 1990s can be explained by the 
exceptionally strong regulatory role of the social partners in French UI, which as 
mentioned is – uniquely for a basic unemployment insurance scheme – governed 
through periodic collective agreements at the national level. Condemned by common 
organisational interests to find a mutually acceptable way of adapting this institutional 
arrangement to cost pressures, the employers’ associations and the unions repeatedly 
found common cause in status-maintaining recalibrations that mainly benefited their 
core constituencies of large manufacturing firms and well-integrated older workers 
respectively. The limited legitimacy of French governments to intervene decisively to 
enforce alternative policy directions in unemployment protection was only 
compounded by the dynamics of partisan competition, which meant the social 
partners could always rely on the support of the Parliamentary opposition for attempts 
to head off any ‘statist takeover’ of their regulatory prerogatives in this area. In this 
context, governments concerned about issues of social cohesion could at best temper 
dualistic policy adjustment at the margins, for which their main instrument was the 
development of subsidised employment contracts for particularly disadvantaged 
groups in the labour market (Clegg, 2005). 
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While Palier and Thelen (2010) see the dualisation of policies for the unemployed as a 
structural feature of the adjustment of the coordinated market economies of 
continental European countries to enhanced competitive pressures, it was thus 
particularly pronounced in the French case as a result of the institutional configuration 
of unemployment protection and the incentives and constraints this generated for 
different policy actors (cf. also Clegg, forthcoming). Furthermore, though an apparent 
‘complementarity’ developed between the dualistic regulation of the unemployment 
risk and the use of non-standard employment arrangements, in France the former was 
not driven by the latter, as Palier and Thelen’s account of dualisation suggests. On the 
contrary, the rapid growth in ‘precarious’ forms of employment that started from the 
late 1980s was arguably driven by the dualistic reforms to unemployment protection 
institutions enacted earlier in the decade, nicely illustrating how the regulation of the 
risk of unemployment shapes, as much as it is shaped by, the development of 
employment norms. 
 
How then can we then explain that this path of institutional development was at least 
partially reversed in the 2000s? Part of the story is about growth of tensions and 
conflicts within the organisations that represent socio-economic interests in France, 
especially on the employers’ side. The late 1990s saw the traditional monopoly of the 
large metalworking federation over social policy issues within the main French 
employers’ association increasingly challenged by representatives of firms with very 
different interests (Woll, 2006)5. The employers’ aggressive promotion of activation 
going into the renegotiation of the UI agreement in 2000/2001 reflected the growing 
influence of service-sector employers, and also opened the possibility for 
unconventional bargains – trading more aggressive activation for the expanded 
entitlement and looser eligibility requirements – to be struck with the unions (Clegg, 
2010: 93-94). 
 
Much of the impetus for the broader change of policy direction has come from 
strategic action by government, however. Given the apparently sharp break from 2008 
in the developmental trends across all the dimensions analysed here, it is hard not to 
                                                 
5 These power-shifts were symbolised in the name of the confederation being changed in 1998 from the 
traditional Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) to the Mouvement des Entreprises de 
France (MEDEF). 
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attribute particular causal significance in this regard to the election the previous year 
of Nicolas Sarkozy, who ran for President on a boldly proclaimed programme of 
‘rupture’ with what he saw as three decades of failed policies in the socio-economic 
sphere. Sarkozy certainly showed considerable reformist zeal in the field of labour 
market policy, and a willingness to intervene more assertively than before in areas of 
labour market policy under the formal control of the social partners, such as UI 
(Freyssinet, 2010). He was also rather adroit in neutralising the influence of potential 
opponents of reform6, a process in which he was abetted by the Socialist Party, who 
through their internal conflicts effectively managed to neutralise themselves. 
 
At the same time, the role of Sarkozy’s willingness to break with conventional 
governmental thinking in French labour market policy should not be overplayed. 
Reforms such as the introduction of the RSA built on and amplified earlier policy 
developments that had been implemented under previous governments, both 
conservative and socialist.  The RSA was indeed devised and championed by a former 
civil servant who had been closer to the socialists than to the right before entering 
Sarkozy’s first government, and in 2007 the policy featured not only in Sarkozy’s 
manifesto but also that of his socialist opponent (Damon, 2009). Other proposals, 
such as the merger between UNEDIC and the PES, had been on the policy agenda for 
a long time and had been gathering momentum even before Sarkozy’s election 
(Barbier, 2007; Rousseau, 2008). In short, the reforms of 2008 and 2009 are the 
manifestation of an ideational shift on labour market policy issues that had been 
underway in France for some time. 
 
This has obviously intersected with the broader evolution of international ideas and 
paradigms regarding social and labour market policy. Recent reforms in this field 
have all been preceded by reports making reference to international ‘best practice’ and 
European orientations. The increased emphasis on activation in French labour market 
policy is clearly congruent with the guidelines of the European Employment Strategy, 
for example (Palier and Petrescu, 2007). But at least in French social policy it is hard 
                                                 
6 Sarkozy bombarded the social partners with reform projects on many fronts, limiting their capacity to 
effectively organise opposition on any one. He is also widely credited with having publicised a system 
of fraudulent usage of social insurance and training funds, in the process discrediting especially the 
aforementioned federation of metalworking employers, who opposed many of his labour market 
reforms. 
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to attribute causal policy influence to the discourses and reform agendas promoted by 
international organisations or the EU. Rather, French policy makers appear to make 
use of international guidelines, recommendations and best practice to help to lever the 
reforms that they have already decided, independently, to pursue (cf. Erhel et al., 
2005). 
 
To fully understand the paradigm shift in French labour market policy in the 2000s, it 
is instead necessary to appreciate how the dualisation of unemployment protection 
was itself a vector for ideas and policy practices that would ultimately come to 
destabilise this adjustment trajectory from within. The notion of activation was not 
simply imported into France; it already existed, in a ‘Gallicised’ form, in the insertion 
dimension of SA policy. As described above, this was initially a rather hollow 
legitimating device, introduced to build acceptance for the introduction of a (cheaper) 
type of social benefit that was alien to, and indeed pushed against the fundamental 
principles of, the work-related social insurance benefits around which the French 
welfare model was built; insertion was, in other words, an alibi for dualising reforms. 
But having been introduced for these reasons, the rhetoric of returning social benefit 
claimants to the labour market soon developed a transformational potential of its own. 
In response to negative evaluation reports insertion was first refocused and 
reinvigorated in SA policy, shedding many of its social aspects and increasingly 
emphasising labour market integration (Clegg and Palier, forthcoming). This helped 
popularise the notion of activation and encouraged its extension to the realm of UI, 
after which multiple activation policies for different groups of benefit claimants co-
existed in parallel. Official appraisals soon came in turn to identify this as a source of 
poor outcomes (e.g. CERC, 2005), and made a case on grounds of efficiency and 
effectiveness for reforms that pushed ever more clearly against the pre-existing policy 
logic and division of institutional labour in French unemployment policy, such as the 
merger of UNEDIC and the PES and the reconnection of SA to general employment 
policy. While political leaders and other policy entrepreneurs were perhaps important 
in driving through change at different stages of this process, they harnessed policy 
repertoires that had grown relatively organically out of earlier rounds of labour market 
policy development. 
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In this way, the dualising thrust of French unemployment protection reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s is being gradually, and in some respects rather seamlessly, displaced 
by a quite contrary orientation in the new millennium. Certainly, working-age benefit 
claimants in France continue to receive very different levels of economic support 
depending on their eligibility for UI, and in this sense there has been only limited 
benefit homogenisation. However, not only has UI been made more accessible to 
those with irregular patterns of labour market attachment in the 2000s, but working-
age benefit claimants are more and more seen as a single group of labour market 
participants who should be provided support, tailored to their individual 
circumstances but on the basis of standardised assumptions, from the same set of 
labour market institutions irrespective of their work record or benefit status. From this 
perspective the earlier dualisation of French unemployment protection looks 
increasingly like a protracted stage in the as yet incomplete development of an 
integrated benefit-and-service system through which the employment-related risks 
that characterise post-industrial labour markets can be more adequately regulated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed recent transformations in the regulation of the risk of 
unemployment in France. It has shown that a relatively high level of formal 
institutional stability has masked significant variations in the primacy of particular 
policy logics over time. While French labour market policy in the 1990s was 
characterised by a widening gulf between policies for good and bad contributors and a 
persistent emphasis on reducing the labour supply of less productive workers, reforms 
in the (especially late) 2000s have instead emphasised the activation of an enlarged 
pool of jobseekers, partly harmonising and coordinating the conditions on which, and 
institutions through which, different working-age benefit claimants receive public 
support. 
 
Possibly the most visible driver of this change in policy direction was the growing 
assertiveness of governments, which weakened the traditional influence of the social 
partners over norm setting and policy steering in key areas of French labour market 
policy. As has been argued in this chapter, however, this in turn was possible only 
because governments were able to harness the transformative potential of initially 
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marginal policy developments that had been enacted as part-and-parcel of the earlier 
dualistic adaptation of French labour market institutions. In this way it can be seen 
that the highly incremental pattern of institutional adjustment that has characterised 
French labour market policy has been rather ambiguous, serving the interests of 
particular socio-economic coalitions in the short-term but also setting free policy 
dynamics that would over time help to challenge these. 
 
Understanding the dialectic relationship between the reproduction of the logics 
dualisation and integration in French labour market policy also helps to better 
understand some of its current contradictions and more clearly appreciate its uncertain 
future prospects. Because although the dynamic of integration appears at time of 
writing to have the wind in its sails, and has even resisted the first effects of the global 
economic crisis, it would be premature to conclude that it has fully supplanted 
dualising tendencies. France remains some way from having a fully integrated 
benefit-and-service system for the non-employed, and the uncoordinated overlap 
between reforms in UI and SA remains problematic (Cornilleau and Elbaum, 2009). 
Unlike in the Netherlands (see Hoogenboom, this volume), the social partners 
retained an institutional foothold in and an influence over French UI even after the 
reforms of the late 2000s, in which Sarkozy was indeed criticised for conceding too 
much to their wishes (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2009). In the context of heightened 
austerity that is certainly ahead, it thus remains an open question how the ongoing 
conflict between the logics of integration and of dualisation in French labour market 
policy will play out. 
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Table 3.1 Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and Key Institutional Features of 
French Labour Market Policy, 1990-2010 
 
 1990 2000 
 
BENEFITS 
 
Unemployment Insurance 
Benefit Amount (% gross 
reference salary) 
From 57.4 to 75% From 57.4 to 75% 
Financing Contributions Contributions 
Governance Social Partners Social Partners 
Lead Delivery Agency Assedic (+ ANPE) Pôle Emploi 
 
Unemployment Assistance 
Benefit Amount (Monthly 
maximum in Euros / % gross 
minimum wage) 
ASS AI ASS ATA 
317 / 39 203 / 25 461 / 34 325 / 24 
Financing General taxation General taxation 
Governance Central state Central state 
Lead Delivery Agency Assedic (+ ANPE) Pôle Emploi 
 
Social Assistance 
Benefit Amount (Monthly 
maximum (single person) in 
Euros / % gross minimum wage 
RMI RSA 
317 / 39 460 / 34 
Financing General + Local taxation General + Local taxation 
Governance Central state + Local authorities Central state + Local authorities 
Lead Administrative Agency CAF (Family benefit fund) + 
Local partnerships 
CAF (family benefit fund) + 
Pôle Emploi 
 
SERVICES 
 
Placement Services and Employment Policies for Unemployed 
Financing General taxation General taxation + Local 
taxation + Contributions 
Governance Central state Central state 
Lead Administrative Agency ANPE Pôle Emploi 
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Figure 3.1 Unemployment benefit recipients as % unemployed, 1990-2010 
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Source: UNEDIC UNIstatis. Figures for December each year, reflecting % of all jobseekers registered 
with PES and obliged to actively seek work (categories 1,2,3,6,7 and 8) + DRE.  
 
Figure 3.2 Beneficiaries of SA and UA, 1980-2008 
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Source: DREES 
 
Table 3.2: Evolution of Contribution Conditions and Benefit Durations in UI 
 
 1992 - 2001 2001 - 2002 2003 - 2005 2006 - 2008 2009 - 
Minimum 
Contribution 
Requirement 
4 months in 
last 8 
4 months in 
last 18 
6 months in 
last 22 
6 months in 
last 22 
4 months in 
last 28 
Minimum 
Benefit 
Duration 
4 months 4 months 7 months 7 months 4 months 
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Maximum 
Benefit 
Duration 
30 months 
(over-50s = 45 
months) 
30 months 
(over-50s = 45 
months) 
23 months 
(over-50s = 36 
months) 
23 months 
(over-50s = 36 
months) 
24 months 
(over-50s = 
36 months) 
Source: UNIjuridis 
 
Figure 3.3 Annual Stocks of Early Retirement and DRE 
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Source: UNIstatis: Data refer to stocks in December of each year 
 
Table 3.3: The Re-Regulation of the Risk of Unemployment in France, 1990-2010 
 
Dimension Dynamic of Change 
Unemployment 
protection as a 
social right 
Dualisation (1990-2001) 
Sharper distinction between UI for good contributors and SA for 
bad 
Integration (2001-2003, 2008-) 
Relaxation of contributory conditions in UI 
Unemployment 
as an 
administrative 
risk category 
Dualisation (1990-2008) 
Opening and maintenance of exit routes out of labour market 
Integration (2008-) 
End of DRE for UI/UA claimants 
SA claimants registered as jobseekers 
API integrated in SA 
Jobseeking requirements for all adults in households receiving SA 
Jobseekers in 
post-industrial 
labour market 
Dualisation (1990-2008) 
Activation in SA only (1990-2000) 
Different activation policies for SA and UI 
Integration (2008-) 
Partial merger of UI administration and PES 
Integration of activation policies for SA claimants in work of PES 
Single set of ‘rights and responsibilities’ for all jobseekers  
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Annex 3.1 Major Reforms in Provision for the Unemployed in France, 1990-2010 
 
Year Reform 
1991 Unemployment Assistance 
• Removal of eligibility for Allocation d’Insertion (AI) from first-time job seekers 
and single-women with dependent children and no employment record 
1992 Unemployment Insurance 
• Creation of Allocation Unique Degressive (AUD) 
• Introduction of ‘degressivity’ mechanism, whereby after a specific period of full 
receipt benefits are periodically reduced over unemployment spell by between 8 and 
17% depending on age 
• Minimum contribution period increased from 3 to 4 months (in last 8) 
• Reduction of benefit duration for all unemployed, but especially those with more 
limited contribution histories (6 months in last 12 months), who now receive benefit 
for 7 months instead of 15 to 21 (depending om age) previously 
•  
1993 Unemployment Insurance 
• ‘Degressivity’ mechanism in AUD reinforced 
1994 Public Employment Service, Job Search and Activation 
• Specific effort to target subsidised employment contracts on recipients of social 
assistance (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, RMI) to facilitate labour market 
reintegration 
1995 Unemployment Insurance 
• Creation of Allocation de Remplacement pour l’Emploi (ARPE), an early 
retirement benefit financed through unemployment insurance for those with 40 years 
contribution record 
1997 Unemployment Insurance  
• ‘Degressivity’ mechanism eased, with benefits now reduced every 6 months 
instead of 4 previously 
Unemployment Assistance 
• Tightening of both means-test and contribution requirement for Allocation 
Spécifique de Solidarité (ASS) 
1998 Unemployment Assistance 
• Significant increase in amount of AI and Allocation Spécifique de Solidarité 
(ASS) 
Public Employment Service, Job Search and Activation 
• Extension of possibility for recipients of RMI, ASS and single-parent benefit 
(Allocation de Parent Isolé, API) to temporarily receive income from benefits and 
work together 
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2001 Unemployment Insurance 
• Creation of Allocation de Retour a l’emploi (ARE) 
• Introduction of requirement for ARE recipients to sign a personalised plan for 
return to work (plan d’aide au retour a l’emploi, PARE) 
• Suppression of ‘dergessivity mechanism’ 
• Loosening of contribution requirements for those with shortest contribution 
records 
2002 Unemployment Insurance 
• Increase in minimum period of contribution from 4 to 6 months; reduction in 
maximum period of benefit receipt from 30 to 23 months (or 45 to 36 for over-50s) 
2004 Social Assistance 
• Decentralisation of RMI 
• Refocusing of insertion on labour market integration, particularly for long-term 
claimants of RMI 
2005 Public Employment Service, Job Search and Activation 
• Law on social cohesion seeks to encourage reinforced cooperation at local level 
between different labour market policy administrations 
2006 Unemployment Insurance 
• Reinforcement and personalisation of activation measures for unemployment 
insurance beneficiaries 
Public Employment Service, Job Search and Activation 
• Further extension of possibility for recipients of RMI, ASS and API to 
temporarily receive income from benefits and work together 
2008 Public Employment Service and Job Search 
• Merger of ANPE and Assedic (delivery-level institutions of UI system) to create 
Pôle Emploi 
• Law on the rights and responsibilities of jobseekers reforms job search and 
sanctions regime for all jobseekers 
• Receipt of benefit without job-search requirements (dispense de recherche de 
l’emploi) scrapped 
 2009 Unemployment Insurance 
• Loosening of contribution requirements, with minimum contribution period 
reduced from 6 to 4 months, in a reference period extended from 22 to 28 months 
• Benefit duration now based on duration of contribution, between a minimum of 4 
months and a maximum of 24 (36 for over-50s) 
Social Assistance / Public Employment Service, Job Search and Activation 
• Replacement of RMI and API with Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA), including 
more generous in-work variant acting as permanent subsidy (replacing previous rules 
concerning temporary receipt of income from benefits and work together) 
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• Reform of insertion to streamline instruments and increase work-focus 
 
 
